Source: (2022) Dreams Lab: assembling knowledge security in Sino-Dutch research collaborations, European Security, 32:2, 233-251, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2127317
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Article
Dreams Lab
Amid concerns over the rivalry between Washington and Beijing, the discourse and practice of knowledge security have become prevalent in Europe. This is especially true with regard to Sino-Western research collaborations on emerging technologies. Despite the scientific and economic benefits, these collaborations are increasingly perceived as a potential threat in the context of broader concerns with so-called hybrid threats. Knowledge security has emerged as a key term to identify and mitigate the risk of espionage, unwanted knowledge transfers, censorship, and the misuse of dual-use technology.
To understand knowledge security and its implications, the article offers a qualitative, in-depth case study of Dreams Lab in the Netherlands: an AI research project run by the University of Amsterdam and the Free University of Amsterdam and funded by the Chinese company Huawei. Li’s practices of assemblage are used as an analytical framework to answer the question: how and why a diverse group of actors were brought together to respond to Dreams Lab and govern scientific knowledge on emerging technologies? By analysing the discourse and practice of knowledge security, the article offers crucial insights into how the great power rivalry is shaping scientific research and the international exchange of knowledge and technology. -
Article
China's influence on education in the Netherlands
The Clingendael Institute has investigated the extent to which there is political influence from China in secondary and higher education in the Netherlands, and what the consequences are. The summary of the 2020 report reads as follows:
"The findings of this exploratory study lead to the conclusion that there is political influence by China in higher education and science in the Netherlands. No indications were found of influence in secondary schools that collaborate with the two Confucius Institutes in the Netherlands. The extent to which and the way in which political influence takes place in higher education varies per sector, target group and sub-activity.
Political influence mainly takes the form of (indirect) incitement to self-censorship among researchers, policy officers at universities, students, and among employees or directors of academic publishers who work with or in China. This not only concerns self-imposed restrictions with regard to free expression, but also with regard to the choice of subjects for research.
In addition, researchers and publishers are faced with censorship of publications of scientific work. Influencing also takes place when it comes to conducting scientific research about China, or in and with China, for example by limiting research possibilities.
China's political influence on higher education and science in the Netherlands has two broad consequences: it leads to an impairment of the Dutch knowledge position with regard to China, and to an impairment of the quality of research on China and of research in other areas that is (partly) carried out in or with China."
Source: d'Hooghe, I & Dekker, B. (2020), China's invloed op onderwijs in Nederland: een verkenning. Rapport Institituut Clingendael. Juni 2020.
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Article
Relations between Dutch and Chinese knowledge institutes
The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) has asked the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO) to conduct an exploratory study of collaborations between knowledge institutions and China, partly in response to the 'China memorandum' that old Minister Blok wrote on 15 May 2019 to the House of Representatives.
In addition to the benefits of academic collaboration with China, the China memorandum also discusses the possible risks associated with these collaborations. Chinese cooperation partners are part of a political system in which politics and economics operate in an integrated manner. Chinese institutions therefore have a clear picture of what they want to 'get' from a collaboration with potential partners. As a result, there is a risk of unwanted knowledge transfer from the Netherlands to China in areas that are important to the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands there is currently little insight into (institutionalised) collaborations between Dutch and Chinese knowledge institutions. The image of that collaboration is fragmented. To estimate any risks as discussed in the China memorandum, it is considered desirable to have that picture.This study offers an inventory (quick scan) to gain insight into the cooperative relationships that exist between six Dutch knowledge institutions and Chinese knowledge institutions. The six participating Dutch knowledge institutions are: Delft University of Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology, Twente University of Technology, Wageningen University, Erasmus University Rotterdam and the University of Groningen.
Source: Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland (2020). Verkenning wetenschappelijke samenwerking Nederlanddse en Chinese kennisinstellingen. Rapport in opdracht van het ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap. November 2020.